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7I. Introduction
One of the most consistent pillars of Russian 
foreign policy throughout history has been its 
pursuit of warm-water ports.1 Given Russia’s 
geographic positioning, ports which didn’t 
freeze over during the harsh Eurasian winters 
were arguably the key to its entrance as a great 
power. The importance of these port cities car-
ried into the Soviet era, as influence stretched 
around the world, along with the need to project 
power globally.2 However, in the age of receding 
arctic ice and expanding hard and soft power 
opportunities in the region, are ports such as 
St. Petersburg or Sevastopol still necessary for 
Russian power projection?
 In this paper, I will discuss how changes 
in both climate and technology are reshaping 
Russian naval ambitions. In the past  
twenty-five years, Russian foreign policy plan-
ners have not only had to adapt to political 
changes in Europe and Asia, but also changes 
with their own geography. Every year, the 
ice which once dominated the Siberian coast 
recedes in a slow but certain retreat as a 
result of excess carbon emissions in the atmo-
sphere. Where there were once vast swathes 
of sea ice, Open Ocean has appeared in its 
place. On the surface, merchant shipping can 
now travel from Europe to Asia along a route 
much faster and safer than those in the Indian 
Ocean, while on the seabed vast newly acces-
sible petroleum reserves are being discovered. 
Together with the easy clearing of ice in ports 
using icebreakers, northern cold-water ports 
are quickly becoming Russia’s most valuable 
assets.
 The thesis of my argument is really 
quite simple. As a result of the impact of cli-
mate change on access to mineral resources 
and trade routes, Russia no longer needs to 
pursue and control traditionally warm-water 
ports to maintain its economic and military 
power. To help present a clear and concise 
analysis, I will refer to this thesis as the 
cold-water transition theory, after the meteo-
rological nature behind this shift in potential 
foreign policy possibilities. Through detailed 
analysis of these changes, theory applications, 
and consideration of dissenting opinions, I 
intend to prove this theory. To validate my 
thesis, I will use existing academic theory to 
build a foundation of credibility. The theory 
that I believe best applies to my cold-water 
transition thesis is offensive realism. Offensive 
realism theory dictates several key points, which 
fit well with current events in the Arctic Circle 
involving Russia and other regional actors.
 When examining any issue involving 
Russia’s connection to the sea, the most obvious 
starting point is to briefly consider its 
1“The Russian Quest for Warm Water Ports,” GlobalSecurity.org, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/warm-water-port.htm. 
2Fukuyama, Francis, Scott Bruckner, and Sally Stoecker, Soviet Political Perspectives on Power Projection. Ft. Belvoir: Defense 
Technical Information Center, 1987. 
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8geographic positioning and climate. The 
vast majority of Russian economic power is 
situated far from the shore, in landlocked 
population centers such as Moscow.3 Though 
not a large hindrance on its own, this posi-
tioning becomes far more troublesome with 
the consideration of the Eurasian climate. 
With much of Russian territory straddling the 
Arctic Circle, weather conditions are a serious 
burden to economic development and political 
expansion. Considered by many to be Russia’s 
most notable feature, the Eurasian winter is 
harsh and unforgiving. With temperatures 
dropping as low as negative sixty-eight de-
grees Celsius, life can crawl to a standstill 
during winter months.4
 Of course, the climate conditions of the 
Russian winter not only hinder travel by land, 
but travel by sea as well. In the early years of 
the Russian Empire, the only ports within its 
territory froze over during the winter, requir-
ing the empire to seek out warm-water ports 
if it ever wished to compete on the interna-
tional stage with the other European powers. 
Warm-water ports can be defined as harbors 
which do not freeze over at any time of the 
year; while their counterpart, cold-water 
ports, can be defined as harbors whose waters 
freeze over during parts of the year. To ad-
dress this issue and establish Russia as a true 
European power, Tsar Peter the Great set out 
to claim such a port. This quest resulted in 
the conquest of what is modern day St. Peters-
burg and other warm-water port cities, events 
which directly resulted in Russia’s ascendance 
onto the world stage.5 These ports continue to 
be economic and military centers of Russian 
power, having played a pivotal role in the de-
velopment of the Russian and Soviet Empires. 
II. Analysis
Analysis Overview
Of course, in order to even attempt to prove 
a theory that disagrees with conventional 
wisdom, a great deal of evidence must be 
brought in to support such claims. There are 
many different factors at work in cold-water 
transition theory, all of which stem from the 
central belief that climate change is a real 
and actively occurring shift in earth’s meteo-
rological conditions. The resulting reduction 
of arctic sea ice from rising temperatures then 
creates a large number of opportunities for 
Russia and the rest of the world, which will 
be examined in this analysis. Such opportuni-
ties include new sea lanes, access to mineral 
resources, and multi-ocean access for arctic 
states, among a great many possibilities. In 
this section I will use evidence to support my 
claim that there exists sufficient proof that 
these factors signal the beginning of the end 
of Russian reliance on warm-water ports to 
maintain its current position in world affairs.
Climate Change
At the very root of cold-water transition 
theory is the overwhelming evidence of global 
climate change.6,7 Whether it is manmade, 
or a result of natural climate conditions, the 
reality of climate change is nearly scientifi-
cally undeniable. This is supported by an ever 
increasing
3“The Russian Quest for Warm Water Ports,” GlobalSecurity.org.  
4Etty, John. “Russia’s Climate and Geography,” History Today. (Accessed November 23, 2015). http://www.historytoday.com/john-
etty/russia%E2%80%99s-climate-and-geography.
5”The Russian Quest for Warm Water Ports,” GlobalSecurity.org. 
6Schulte, Klaus Martin. “Scientific Consensus on Climate Change?” : Energy & Environment: Vol 19, No 2. July 29, 2009. 
Accessed November 23, 2015.
7Oreskes, Namoi. “The Scientific Consensus on Climate Change,” American Association for the Advancement of Science, (2004). 
9number of scientific foundations, both nation-
al and international, coming to an agreement 
that the earth’s meteorological systems are 
changing.8,9,10 The process behind this is com-
plicated, but can be simplified to a few key 
points.
 According to the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change, scientists have a 
ninety-five percent certainty that the root 
cause of climate change is a global increase of 
greenhouse gases, such as carbon dioxide, in 
the earth’s atmosphere as a result of human 
and geologic activities.11 As these gases build 
up in the atmosphere, they create an ever 
strengthening blanket that traps heat in 
energy. A similar process can be observed on 
the planet Venus, albeit caused by volcanism 
and on a much more dramatic scale.12 The 
increased atmospheric temperature changes 
both water and land temperatures, causing 
glaciers and snowpack to melt at far greater 
rates than can be replaced, resulting in even 
more carbon dioxide being released into the 
air in the process. Because of the fluidity of 
earth’s weather systems, changes can be very 
dynamic, causing very strong storm systems 
that vary from drought to typhoons.13 Over-
all, these changes may appear contrary to the 
term “global warming”; however, they are in 
fact a strong indicator for what is a broad in-
crease in temperature that can still result in 
very strong winter weather in certain areas. 
 With these facts clearly laid out, it 
becomes apparent that there are very genuine 
changes occurring which can have a consid-
erable impact geographically, but politically 
as well. In what can be considered one of the 
most immediately visible changes, the arctic 
ice cap which connects with Russian Siberia 
has begun to recede. According to statistics 
by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration, and backed up by numerous 
published reports in well-known scientific 
journals, the total area coverage of contigu-
ous sea ice in the arctic ocean has declined 
between six-seven percent every decade since 
record keeping began in the 1970s.14,15 This 
reduction is most pronounced in areas of 
ocean and coastline claimed and owned by 
Russia, with a great deal of previously im-
passible sections of sea now open year round. 
The significance of this occurrence cannot be 
underscored nearly enough, and is the basis 
for cold-water transition theory..
 The resulting change in ice coverage 
during winter months brings an important 
question: are northern cities still cold-wa-
ter ports after climate change? Though the 
original definition of a cold-water port would 
include winter icing, this is no longer the 
case. However, for the duration of this paper I 
will continue to call traditionally warm-water 
ports by that name, with the same applying 
to cold-water ports. This will help easily dis-
tinguish these ports from each other during 
analysis and maintain clarity.
8“Understand and Responding to Climate Change,” US National Academy of Sciences.
9 Niel Stenhouse et al. “Meteorologists’ Views About Global Warming: A Survey of American Meteorological Society Professional 
Members,” American Meteorological Society. (2013).
10“Scientific Consensus: Earth’s Climate Is Warming,” NASA, http://climate.nasa.gov/scientific-consensus/ (Accessed November 
23, 2015).
11“Climate Change 2014 Synthesis Report Summary,” Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, (2014). 
12“Greenhouse Effect, Clouds and Winds,” European Space Agency. http://www.esa.int/Our_Activities/Space_Science/Venus_
Express/Greenhouse_effect_clouds_and_winds. (Accessed November 23, 2015).
13“Global Climate Change: Effects,” NASA, http://climate.nasa.gov/effects/. (Accessed November 23, 2015).
14Perovich, D., S. Gerald, S. Hendricks, W. Meier, M. Nicholas, and M. Tschudi. “Arctic Report Card Update for 2014,” National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. http://www.arctic.noaa.gov/reportcard/sea_ice.html. (Accessed November 23, 2015). 
15“National Snow and Ice Data Center,” NSIDC Arctic News and Analysis RSS. http://nsidc.org/arcticseaicenews/. (Accessed 
November 23, 2015).
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New Trade Routes in the Arctic Ocean
Arguably the strongest of the “soft powers,” 
trade is a staple of economic power. As cli-
mate changes causes the sea ice in the arctic 
to recede, a new corridor will open for year-
round travel from the North Sea to Barents 
Straits. This route will allow for travel that 
is not only thirty percent faster by some es-
timates, 16 but will be far safer than current 
sea lanes which traverse highly dangerous 
waters in the Gulf of Aden and Indonesian 
Archipelago. The most critical aspect of this 
is that the near entirety of the route moves 
through Russian waters, giving them un-
paralleled control over what could soon be a 
vital sea lane. The ever present influence of 
offensive realism driven foreign policy deci-
sions has already begun to show itself with 
respect to this opportunity, as these new sea 
lanes are already being used for global trade. 
Though Chinese maritime analyst Gary Li 
believes that it requires “another twenty or 
thirty years of climate change to make it 
fully viable,” the number of ships using these 
routes increases with every year.17 According 
to the Northern Sea Route Information, an 
NGO specializing in promoting such trade 
routes, seventy-one vessels traversed arctic 
trade routes in 2013, up from forty-six the 
previous year.18 Out of those vessels, the vast 
majority were of Russian origin. Though this 
pales in comparison to the estimated seven-
teen thousand of all nationalities which pass 
through the Suez Canal each year, it is still 
considerable growth for a previously unused 
passage.19 This relates to offensive realism, 
because it is a rapid capitalization of a po-
tential opportunity for growth.
 Another benefit of this new sea lane 
is its proximity to Russian ports. With im-
mediate access to the newly opened arctic 
sea lanes, port cities such as Murmansk and 
Vladivostok will become far more valuable 
for trade than ever before. In fact, should the 
trade routes in the north become as success-
ful as some predict, it can be argued that 
northern ports would become far more valu-
able than any other in Russia.
Emerging Fossil Fuel Access in the Arctic 
Circle
 As the ice caps continue to melt across 
the Arctic, they will begin to expose vast 
amounts of previously inaccessible fossil fuel 
deposits in the process.20 Russia currently 
holds the largest arctic claim of any other 
country, already giving it a strong advantage 
against competitors for these resources.21 
Though oil prices are currently in a period 
of stagnation, global reserves are not finite. 
Current prices are a result of changes in 
production across OPEC states and increas-
ing growth in North America, a situation 
that will certainly not last forever as global 
demand continues to increase with the eco-
nomic growth of the global south.22
 Russia’s economic development over the 
past decade has been largely dictated by the 
export of oil and natural gas.23 This fact has
16Masters, Jonathan. “The Thawing Arctic: Risk and Opportunities,” Council on Foreign Relations. (2013). 
17Ibid
18 “List of NSR Transit Voyages in 2014 Navigational Season,” Northern Sea Rout Information Office, (2014).
19”NSR Transit 2013,” Northern Sea Route Information Office.
20Evengård, Birgitta, and Joan Nymand Larsen, The New Artic, 191.
21MacDonald, Fiona. “This Map Shows All the Claims on the Arctic Seafloor,” ScienceAlert, (2015). http://www.sciencealert.
com/this-map-shows-all-country-s-claims-on-the-arctic-seafloor. (Accessed November 23, 2015).
22 Krauss, Clifford, “Oil Prices: What’s Behind the Drop? Simple Economics,” The New York Times, October 05, 2015. 
23Aleksashenko, Sergey, “Rebuilding the Russian Economy: Is a Lack of Policy the Right Policy?,” The Brookings Institution, 
(2015). 
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been made itself rather visible in the current 
Russian federal budget, which has seen a great 
deal of cuts across the board.24 Though some 
experts argue that this may be due to simulta-
neous sanctions imposed by the west in the af-
termath of the Ukraine Crisis, there is a strong 
correlation between oil prices in Russian GDP 
during that period of time.25
 A Russian drive to occupy the arctic 
would be verification of the offensive realism 
component of cold-water transition theory in 
action, as it would indicate a proactive effort to 
secure economic interests. This is, in fact, al-
ready happening. In early August of 2015, the 
Russian Federation submitted to the United 
Nations a territorial claim of more than 1.2 
million square kilometers of ocean in the Arctic 
Ocean.26,27,28 This claim was made on the basis 
of the 1982 UN Convention on Law of the Sea, 
which dictates that a state may lay claim on 
waters that extend up to two-hundred miles 
from its continental shelf.29 Though these 
waters were technically still able to be claimed 
before the recession of the Arctic ice shelf, the 
opening of accessibility and exploration of fossil 
fuel resources on the seabed in these regions is 
very likely to have prompted this action. Within 
these newly claimed waters, the Russian Min-
istry of Mineral Resources believes there to be 
up to thirty-six billion barrels in oil and natural 
gas reserves.30,31 In current valuation of these 
resources, this would be worth over thirty tril-
lion dollars.
 Russia’s push into the Arctic for finan-
cial gain is a clear indicator of offensive realist 
theory at work. As mineral resources and eco-
nomic opportunity become available, theory 
dictates that they will capitalize on these oppor-
tunities. This is important, because it can help 
us predict future actions by actors within the 
region and verifying by proxy many of the other 
points of analysis.
Defense Trends in the Arctic Circle
Another benefit of the retreat of Arctic sea ice 
is the now unhindered access to both Atlantic 
and Pacific oceans from Russian naval bases 
along the Kola Peninsula to Vladivostok in the 
Far East. In a theoretical conflict with NATO, 
control over the Atlantic supply routes connect-
ing North America with Western Europe would 
be a decisive tool for either side.32 Though
24“IMF Survey: Cheaper Oil And Sanctions Weigh On Russia’s Growth Outlook,” IMF Survey : Cheaper Oil And Sanctions Weigh 
On Russia’s Growth Outlook. August 3, 2015. Accessed November 23, 2015. http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2015/
CAR080315B.htm.
25Aleksashenko, Sergey. “Rebuilding the Russian Economy: Is a Lack of Policy the Right Policy?” The Brookings Institution. 
September 25, 2015. Accessed November 23, 2015. http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2015/09/25-rebuilding-russian-
economy-aleksashenko.
26“Russia Submits 1.2 Million Sq Km Arctic Claim to UN,” RT English. August 5, 2015. Accessed November 23, 2015. https://
www.rt.com/business/311627-russia-submits-arctic-claim/.
27Kramer, Andrew E. “Russia Stakes New Claim to Expanse in the Arctic,” The New York Times. August 04, 2015. Accessed November 
23, 2015. http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/05/world/europe/kremlin-stakes-claim-to-arctic-expanse-and-its-resources.html?_r=0.
28Quan, Douglas, and Vladimir Isachenkov. “Russia Submits Claim for 1.2-million Square Kilometres of the Arctic ...including the North 
Pole.” National Post Russia Submits Claim for 12million Square Kilometres of the Arctic including the NorthPole Comments. August 4, 2015. 
Accessed November 23, 2015. http://news.nationalpost.com/news/russia-submits-claim-for-vast-arctic-seabed-territories-at-united-nations.
29”United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,” United Nations, December 10, 1982. Accessed November 23, 2015. 
doi:10.1163/9789004249639-rwunclos-all.
30“Russia Submits 1.2 Million Sq Km Arctic Claim to UN,” RT English. August 5, 2015. Accessed November 23, 2015. https://
www.rt.com/business/311627-russia-submits-arctic-claim/.
31“Russia: International Energy Data and Analysis,” US Energy Information Administration. July 28, 2015. Accessed November 
23, 2015. http://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.cfm?iso=RUS.
32Hanley, John T., Jr. “CREATING THE 1980S MARITIME STRATEGY AND IMPLICATIONS FOR TODAY,” Naval War 
College Review 67, no. 2 (Spring 2014). Accessed November 23, 2015.
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St. Petersburg and the Black Sea ports are 
active year-round, they both require passage 
through geographic bottlenecks controlled by 
NATO powers such as the Denmark Strait in 
the Baltic and the Bosporus Strait in Turkey. 
For Russia or the former Soviet Union, the 
only clear route to the Atlantic originates from 
bases on the Kola Peninsula or Western Sibe-
ria. While in the past these bases would have 
been difficult or impossible to use during the 
harsh winter months, climate change and the 
development of icebreakers have made them 
capable of remaining active year-round.33,34 
Though there are no immediate indications of 
a change in military doctrine along the Arctic 
Circle, Russia and the former Soviet Union 
have already made extensive use of arctic 
waters in their strategic nuclear planning.
 Unlike the United States, which dis-
persed its nuclear ballistic missile carrying 
submarines (SSBNs) across the world’s oceans 
in the hopes of using the vast expanses of 
water to hide, Soviet strategy took a much 
different approach.35 Soviet strategic planners 
chose to use their geographic positioning to 
their advantage, using the vast expanses of 
sea ice and natural gulfs to create a defensive 
shield to cover their submarines in is known as 
Bastion Defense Doctrine. By hiding subma-
rines beneath ice sheets and patrolling natural 
bottlenecks in the Barents and Sea of Okhotsk, 
it was believed that Soviet SSBNs could be 
protected long enough during a conflict to 
launch their nuclear payloads in a first or 
second strike capacity. In this way, cold-water 
ports have already showed their importance 
to Russian foreign policy long before climate 
change provided additional opportunities. This 
is yet another example of offensive realism at 
play, as the previously useless ice sheets in re-
gions such as the Barents Sea were viewed as 
opportunities to grow power and seized upon. 
Given this history, it can be predicted that 
planners will again attempt to find and seize 
upon advantages in the changing meteorolog-
ical conditions for military use. In doing so, 
Russia will continue to lessen its dependence 
on warm-water ports and grow military power 
in the Arctic Circle. 
III. Opposing Arguments 
As with anything else, there are two sides to 
this argument. On one side are the arguments 
which I have made in its support, and on the 
other are potential arguments against it. In this 
section I will attempt to address possible crit-
icism of my thesis and analysis. Because this 
is not based on a currently circulated theory, 
but rather a new one based on many emerg-
ing trends, it would be next to impossible to 
find direct opposition. What I have gathered to 
present as a dissenting voice is a compilation of 
potential arguments based on current trends in 
foreign policy. They are by no means the only 
possible arguments; however, I feel these are 
the most important to immediately consider 
with respect to my analysis. 
 The most obvious response to the asser-
tions made in this paper would be that ports 
such as St. Petersburg and Sevastopol are 
critical to Russia economically and militarily. 
Indeed, St. Petersburg is the second strongest 
Russian city economically by reported GDP as 
33Staalesen, Atle. “New Icebreakers Open Way for Russia in Arctic,” Barentsobserver. May 5, 2015. Accessed November 23, 2015. 
http://barentsobserver.com/en/arctic/2015/05/new-icebreakers-open-way-russia-arctic-05-05.
34Gady, Franz-Stefan. “Russia and China in the Arctic: Is the US Facing an Icebreaker Gap?” The Diplomat. September 7, 2015. 
Accessed November 23, 2015. http://thediplomat.com/2015/09/russia-and-china-in-the-arctic-is-the-us-facing-an-icebreaker-gap/.
35Hanley, John T., Jr. “CREATING THE 1980S MARITIME STRATEGY AND IMPLICATIONS FOR TODAY,” Naval War 
College Review 67, no. 2 (Spring 2014). Accessed November 23, 2015.
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valued by the Brookings Institute, second only 
in the country to Moscow and comparable to 
Charlotte or Cleveland in the United States.36 
Its proximity to the rest of Europe and use as 
the base of operations for the Russian Baltic 
Fleet also make a strong case for its continu-
ing importance to Russian trade and naval 
power.37
 Even if Russian interests in the arctic 
continue to increase, it can be strongly argued 
that Russia will continue to have concern for 
developments in the remaining part of the 
globe beneath the Arctic Circle. The current 
Russian military action against ISIS is one 
such current event that can be used to high-
light this point. Russian movements in support 
of the Assad regime make use of ports around 
the Black Sea and in Syria, in the same way 
that they could be used for other operations 
across the Middle East.38 Based on these 
events, a case can be made that so long as de-
velopments outside of the Arctic Circle influ-
ence Russian economic and political standing; 
it will continue to require warm-water ports to 
compete for global power. 
 Critics of cold-water transition theory 
would of course have many critiques relating 
directly to current events. Russia’s moves in 
the Black Sea and Syria are contrary to the 
idea of a shift towards arctic power. This is not 
without strong reasoning, as Syrian ports in 
the Mediterranean are vital to power projec-
tion and the port of Sevastopol in Crimea can 
be considered the jewel of the Russian Black 
Sea Fleet.39,40 Actions in Syria and Ukraine can 
be considered evidence that Russia continues 
to pursue southern ports. 
 Even while remaining within the realm 
of offensive realism, it can be argued that 
these actions are further proof that Russian 
foreign policy is making use of offensive real-
ism to expand power outside of the arctic and 
would potentially do so in the future as part of 
a global strategy. In Syria, it is speculated that 
Russian support for the Assad regime is not 
only based on the trade of arms, but assurance 
of the continued use of the only permanent 
Russian naval base outside of the Russian 
territory.41 If this is correct, then it would fit 
well with an offensive realist narrative of pur-
suing every possible point of power expansion 
around the world.
 In response to these criticisms, I have a 
number of rebuttals. Though there are many 
valid points to be made in opposition to the 
idea of a shift away from warm-water ports, 
I believe that these arguments are largely 
unable to conclusively prove a requirement for 
warm-water ports in the future. With regards 
to the argument in favor of a continued re-
quirement for warm-water ports built upon 
strong reasoning, I do not believe that this 
criticism would necessarily disprove cold-water 
transition theory. In the coming decades, fossil 
fuel resources in the Middle East are expected 
36“Global Metro Monitor,” The Brookings Institution, (2015). Accessed November 23, 2015. http://www.brookings.edu/research/
reports2/2015/01/22-global-metro-monitor.
37“Baltic Fleet Turns 307,” Rusnavy.com. http://rusnavy.com/news/newsofday/index.php?ELEMENT_ID=9479+%5C. (Accessed 
November 23, 2015).
38“Syrian Civil War: Russian Navy Base Tartus In Syria Giving NATO Cause For Concern While Helping To Prop Up Assad 
Regime,” International Business Times. http://www.ibtimes.com/syrian-civil-war-russian-navy-base-tartus-syria-giving-nato-
cause-concern-while-2092371. (Accessed November 23, 2015).
39“Syrian Civil War: Russian Navy Base Tartus In Syria Giving NATO Cause For Concern While Helping To Prop Up  
Assad Regime,”
40Woolf, Christopher, “Here’s Why Russia Won’t Let Go of Crimea,” Public Radio International. March 3, 2014. . http://www.pri.
org/stories/2014-03-03/here-s-why-russia-won-t-let-go-crimea. (Accessed November 23, 2015)
41“Syrian Civil War: Russian Navy Base Tartus In Syria Giving NATO Cause For Concern While Helping To Prop Up  
Assad Regime,”
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to decline with continued use, allowing for a shift of 
power towards the next frontier in oil and natural 
gas, the Arctic Ocean.42 Even in the very likely sce-
nario that global hotspots for military and econom-
ic activity continue to appear outside of the Arctic 
Circle, the opening of access to northern ports will 
allow for power to be projected from those harbors 
without need for others in warmer waters.43,44,45 As 
was discussed in the military section of the analy-
sis, the recession of sea ice will provide cold-water 
ports with easy access to both Pacific and Atlantic 
oceans, and by extension, the rest of the world. 
Under this reasoning, I would argue that Russia 
could continue to function at a similar capacity 
militarily and economically in a situation where 
it no longer had the ability to use its warm-water 
harbors. This would be in keeping with my thesis, 
which states that Russia no longer requires access 
to the sea to remain a global power.
 In relation to the question of Russian ac-
tivity in Syria, there are a number of factors at 
play in this decision. From a strategic standpoint, 
the Mediterranean would most likely be blocked 
at both exits during a conflict with the west. The 
only potential use of Syrian ports would be to 
contest NATO forces in the Mediterranean while 
being completely isolated from the rest of the 
Russian Navy and Air Force.46 Though this would 
be a thorn in the side of NATO forces in Southern 
European and would require a diversion of resourc-
es from other theaters, the considerable air and 
sea power of France, Italy, Turkey, Greece, and 
of course the US and UK would no doubt be over-
whelming for and Russian fleet. This is of course 
before even considering the proximity of this port 
to NATO bases in Turkey. While these bases are 
certainly useful during peacetime for supply and 
maintenance purposes, they would be isolated from 
the Russian mainland during a conflict with the 
West. Altogether, I would assert that these re-
sponses effectively counter the most obvious criti-
cisms to my analysis and the thesis it supports.
IV. Conclusion
After considerable analysis and discussion of the 
impact that global climate change will have on the 
politics of the Arctic Circle, along with the result-
ing changes in oceanic access from traditionally 
cold-water ports, a clear picture can be made of 
current and future events. The picture made in 
this analysis points towards a shift in possible Rus-
sian power from traditionally warm-water ports to 
cold-water ones along the Arctic Circle. Based upon 
the supporting evidence for this assertion, it can 
be concluded that the thesis argument that Russia 
no longer needs to pursue and control traditionally 
warm-water ports to maintain its economic and 
military power is based upon sound reasoning. 
Though critics may be able to argue that a modern 
Russia cannot live without its southern ports, the 
evidence brought to support cold-water transition 
theory has delivered a clear argument for a deci-
sive change in what has been fundamental Rus-
sian foreign policy for more than three hundred 
years. What was once a hindrance to its ability 
to ability to become global superpower, Russia’s 
cold-water ports will soon become the key to its 
reentry as a power player on the world stage.
42Mehrabi, Shah, “The Impact of Decline in Oil Prices on the Middle Eastern Countries,” Global Awareness Society International 
24th Annual Conference, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, USA, May 2015.
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